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Abstract
In this paper we consider a generalization of the linear-quadratic differential game stud-
ied in Engwerda (1997). We show that the theorCti:al results obtained in that paper
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I. Introduction
The last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several problems in eco-
nomics using dynamic game theory. In particular in the area of environmental economics
and macro-economic policy coordination dynamic games are a very natural framework
to model problems (see e.g. de Zeeuw and van der Ploeg (1991), Máler (1992), Kaitala.
Pohjola and Tahvonen (1992) and Dockner, Feichtinger and Jorgensen (1985), Tabellini
(1986), Fershtman and Kamien (1987), Petit (1989), Levine and Brociner (1994), van
Aarle, Bovenberg and Raith (1995), Neck and Dockner (1995), Douven and Engwerda
(1995)). Particularly in macro-economic policy coordination problems, the open-loop
Nash strategy is often used as a benchmark to evaluate outcomes under different con-
trol strategies such as the Nash feedback and the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg
equilibria. In Engwerda (1997) several aspects of open-loop Nash equilibria are stud-
ied of the standard linear-quadratic differential game as considered by Starr and Ho in
(1969). Both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique solution for
the finite-planning horizon case are given, and it is shown that there exist situations
where the set of associated Riccati differential equations has no solution, whereas the
problem does have an equilibrium. Furthermore, conditions are given under which this
strategy converges if the planning horizon expands, and a detailed study of the infinite
planning horizon r.ase is given. In particular it is shown that, in general, the infinite
horizon problem has no unique equilibrium and that the limit of the above menti~~~ed
converged strategy may be not an equilibrium for the infinite planning horizon problem.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we consider an extension of the standard
game. We show that under an invertibility condition similar results can be obtained.
in particular we show how for the infinite planning horizon game all equilibria can be
easily obtained from the eigenspace structure of a Hamiltonian matrix that is associated
with the game. Second, we use these results to study an example of a dynamic macro-
economic policy game. We analyse the conflict between macro-economic policymakers
on output stabilization that arises in the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), to which
the European Union countries have committed themselves in the Maastricht Treaty of
1991. Basically, the analysed model is an extension of the two-country linear-quadratic
dynamic stabilization game studied by Neck and Dockner (1995) and Turnovsky, Basar
and d'Orey (1988) to a two-country EMU setting.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we start by stating the problem
analysed in this paper and show the equivalent resiilts of Engwerda (1997). Since, from
an application point of view, the infinite planning horizon is of particular interest, we
present in section 3 an algorithm to compute all equilibria of the infinite planning hori-
zon problem. For the sake of simplicity of presentation, wé will consider in both these
sections only the two-player game. The generalization to the N-player case is, however,
straightforward. This is illustrated in section 4, where we use the algorithm in a simula-
tion study o[ the differential game on output stabilization in the EMU . The paper ends
with some concluding remarks.
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II. Analysis of the general model
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called players)
try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls a
different set of inputs to a single system, described by a differential equation of arbitrary
order. We are looking for combinations of pairs of strategies of both players which are
secure against any attempt by one player to unilaterally alter his strategy. That is, for
those pairs of strategies which are such that if one player deviates from his strategy he
will only lose. In the literature on dynamic games this problem is well-known as the
open-loop Nasii non-zero-sum linear quadratic differential game (see e.g. Starr and Iio
(1969), Simaan and Cruz (1973), Ba~ar and Olsder (1982) or Abou-Kandil and Bertrand
(1986)). Formally the system we consider is as follows:
i- Ax f Blul -~ BZU2i x(fi) - xo, (1)
where x is the n-dimensional state of the system, u; is an m-dimensional (control) vector
player i can manipulate, xo is the initial state of the system, A, Br, and BZ are constant
matrices oï appropriate dimensions, and i denotes the time derivative of x.
The performance criterium player i- 1,2 aims to minimíze is:
~ x(t) `
J,(ut,uz) .- ?x(t~)Th,~x(tr) f 2 f t~{(x(t)TU~ (t)u2(t))TF, u,(t) lll }dt,uz(t)
Gl; P o;
where F; :- PT Ri; N; is semi-positive definite, K;~ is semi-positive definite
GT ~'T Rz~
and R,~ positive definite, i- 1, 2. Note that this performance criterium is more general
than the one usually considered in literature, where F, is assumed to be diagonal.
Throughout this paper we will assume that the following matrix G is invertible:
G :- Rr~ Nr (2)- T ~~NZ R~2
[n this section we consider in detail the existence of open-loop Nash equilibria of this
differential game, for both a finite as an infinite planning horizon. Due to the stated
assumptions both cost functionals J;,i - 1,'l, are strictly convex functions of u; for all
admissible control functions u„ j~ i and for all xo. This implies that the conditions
following from the minimurn principle are both necessary and suf6cient (see e.g. Ba~ar
and Olsder (1982, section 6.5)).
Minimization of the flamiltonian
fl; :- (xT uiui )T F, I u((tt)) I f ~T ( Ax f Bru~ -F ó2uz), r- 1, 2
` u2(t) J
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with respect to u; yields the optimality conditions:
G r ui(t) ~--~ Pix(t) t Bi~i(t) 1.l uz(t) Oz x(t) ~ Bz ~z(t) J
Due to our invertibility condition ( 2) we can rewrite this as
u;(t) G,-, P;x(t) f B; ,~i,(t)
u2(t) -- ( O;x(t) f B; ~Gz(t) )~
Here, the n-dimensional vectors t,i;(t) satisfy
~t(t) --(Q~x(t) f P,u; i- O;u~ f AT~t(t)), with ~;(t1) - jt;lx(tJ),i - 1, 2.
and
~(t) - Ax(t) f- Blu;(t) f Bzui(t); x(~) - xo.
Introducing the matrix M :-
T r T r l
-Af (BiBz)G-' ~~ (BiBz)G-' I Q~ ~ (BiBz)G-~ I B~ I
Q~ -(Pi~i)G-1 pZ AT -(Pi~~)~-`1 ( ~' ) -(P~~~~G-1`` Bz il
I
(3)
(4)
`
~ Qz - (P,Oz)G-' ~T -(PZOz)G-' ~ ~' ~ AT - (Pz~z)G-'
` BT I ~z ` z
(5)
we see that the problem has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium if and only if the
differential equation
dt ~
x(t) ~ - ~ x(t) ~
1G~(t) - M tV~(t)
~z(t) ~z(t)
with boundary conditions :z(0) - xo, t[i~(tt) - Ií~tx(t~) - 0 and ~iz(t~) - Kzfx(tt) - 0,
has a unique solution. Denoting the state variable (xT(t) ~ii (t) zli2 (t))T by y(t), we can
rewrite this two-point boundary value problem in the standard form
Y(t) --My(t), with Py(~) f Qy(tl) -(xó 0 o)T, (6)
! 0 0 0 0 0
where M is give.n by (5), P- 0 0 0 and Q- K~~ 1 0
0 0 0 -IízJ 0 ! )
From (6) we have immediately that problem (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium
if and only if
(P } Qe-n~~,)y(~) - (xó 0 ~)T,
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or, equivalently,
(PeMt~ {Q)e Me~y(~) - (x ó ~ ~)T,
is uniquely solvable for every xo.
Using the following notation:
H(tr) :- W~~(tr) f Wr~(tr)h~r t w,3(tr)h~r,
with W(tr) -(W;;(tr)) {i, j- 1, 2, 3; W;; E R"X"j :- exp(Mtr),
elementary matrix analysis then shows that
(7)
Theorem 1:
The two-player linear quadratic differential game (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equi-
librium for every initial state if and only if matrix H(tr) is invertible. Moreover, the
open-loop Nash equilibrium solution as well as the associated state trajectory can be
calculated from the linear two-point boundary value problem (6). t7
Next, consider the following set of coupled asymmetric Riccati-type differential equa-
tlOils:
( K, l ( -AT 0`h2J-(IO-Ar ic P, o, r, B; oP2 O, - 0 B2
~ h~ ~ ~-Af (B,B,)G-' ~ pT )) f ( h~ ) ((BiBs)G-r ~ ~BOz z 2
P, O, , ( PT Q K, t l K,
( P~Gz ~ G- ` Gz ) - ( Q, )); ( k2(t1) J - ( h2r ~ (8)
Let K;(t) satisfy this set of Kiccati equations and assume that the players use the strategy
~ ui(t) 1 --G-i ~ PT f- BTti,(t) 1~(t,0)yo, (9)u;(t) J 02 f B~ KZ(t) J
where ~(t,0) is the solution of the transition equation
~(t,0) - I A - ( BiBz)G-` I PT ~ BTh'(t) ~~ ~(t,0); ~(0,0) - I.` ` O2 t B~ lí~(t)
Now, define a(,;(t) :- !í;(t)~(t,0)xo. Then, obviously t[i;(t) - K;(t)~(t,0)xo f
K,(t)~(t, 0)xo. Substitution of K; from ( 6) and ~(t, 0) into these equations shows then
that x(t) :- ~(t,0)xo, ~i,(t) and ~i2(t) satisfy the two-point boundary value problem (6).
This proves the following claim:
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Theorem 2:
The two-player linear quadratic differential game (1) has a unique open-loop Nash equi-
librium for every initial state provided the set of Riccati equations (8) has a solution.
Moreover, the equilibrium strategies are then given by (9). O
The following result gives the exact relationship that exists between solvability of the
set of Riccati equations and existence of equilibrium strategies for the game. Like the
other results that will be presented in this section, a proof can be given along the lines
in Engwerda (1997) for the standard case, where F; is assumed to be diagonal. Detailed
proofs are therefore omitted.
Theorem 3:
The following statements are equivalent:
1) For all t~ E[0, t~] there exists a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium for the two-player
linear quadratic differential game (1) defined on the interval [O,t~].
2) H(t) is invertible for all t~ E[O,t~].
3) The set of Riccati differential equations (8) has a solution on [0, t~]. ~
In our analysis of convergence properties of the equilibrium strategy and the infinite
hnrizon case, the set of all M-invariant subspaces plays a crucial role. Therefore we
introduce a separate notation for this set:
~bi'"v :- {7 ~MT C 7 }.
In particular, the with ( 8) associated set of algebraic Riccati equations, (ARE),
(0)-(I -~T -AT)f( p~ G2)G-ll ~' BZ ~)(h~~f
~ Í2~ ~-Af (B~Bz)G-~ ( pz II }` 1tis I (( BiBs)G-' I ~' B2 ~) ~ h2 ~ f
~~ ~2 O2 ~ G I ~ O~ ~ - ~ Qz )) ' (IO)
can be calculated directly from the following collection of M-invariant subspaces:
0 0~no~ :- ~IC E ~1~1~"~IK ~!m I 0 - R3n}.
0 I
The exact result on how all solutions of (ARE) can be calculated is given in the next
theorem. In this theorem we use the notation a(H) to denote the spectrum of matrix
H.
G
T'heorem 4:
(ARE) has a real solution ( lí~, Kz) if and only if lí~ - YX-' and Iíz - ZX-' for some
X 1
IC -: Im Y I E~po'.
Moreover, if the strategies ~ ul(i) ~ --G-I I ~T } BThI ~~(t,0)xo are used in` z( ) ` z z z
system (1), the spectrum of the closed-loop matrix A-(B~Bz)G-' PT f BTK~(t)Oz f Bz Kz(t)
coincides with o(-M~K). 0
Next we consider the question how the open-loop equilibrium solution changes when
the planning horizon t~ tends to infinity. To study convergence properties for problem
(1), it seems reasonable to require that problem (1) has a properly defined solution
for every finite planning horizon. Therefore we will make the following well-posedness
assumption (see theorem 1),
H(t~) is invertible for all t~ G oo. (11)
T~ derive general convergence results we define first
Definit.ion 5:
M is called dichotomically separable if there exist subspaces V~ and Vz such that MV C
V„i - 1,2, V~ ~ Vz - IR3n, where dimV~ - n, dimVz - 2n, and moreover Re a~
Re p for all a E a(M~Vi), p E a(M~Vz). o
Theorem 6:
Assume that the well-posedness assumption (11) holds.
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Then, if M is dichotomically separable and Span K~~ e Vz - 1R~,
Iíz7
K~(0, t~) ---~ YoXó', and Kz(0, t~) -~ ZoXó'
Here Xo, Yo, Zo are defined by (using the notation of definition 5) Vl -.
Span(Xó Yó Zo )T. O
Finally we consider the case that the performance criterion player i- 1, 2 likes to
minimize is given by:
lim J~(ui,uz).e~~~
The information structure is similar to the finite-planning horizon case. Each player only
knows the initial state of the system and has to choose a control for the entire infinite
Z
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time horizon. So, the actions are now described as functions of time, where time runs
from zero to infinity. Since we only like to consider those outcomes of the game that
yield a finite cost to both players, we restrict ourselves to consider only control functions
belonging to the following set,
U:- {~ uZ(t) ~,t E [O,ao)~ifim~J;(u,,uz) G oo, i- 1,2.}
Note that a necessary condition that must be satisfied by the system is that both (A, B, )
and (A, Bz) are stabilizable. Moreover, we assume that Q; is positive definite w.r.t. the
controllability subspace G A, B; ). We have:
Theorem 7:
The infinite-planning horizon two-player linear quadratic differential game has for every
initial state an open-loop Nash equilibrium strategy ~ ur ~ if and only if there existuz
Iír and Kz that are solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) satisfying the
additional constraint that the eigenvalues of A~, :- A- (B,Bz)G-r PT } BT1e' l areOz f Bz Kz Iall situated in the left half complex plane. In that case, the strategy
( uz(t) )--G-' I ~T f- BTKz )~(t,d)zo,O ` z z
where ~(t, 0) satisfies the transition equation ~(t, 0) - A~;~(t, 0); ~(0, 0) - I, is an open-
loop Nash equilibrium strategy. Moreover, the costs obtained by using this strategy for
the players are 2xo.tif;ao, i- 1,2, where M; is the unique positive semi-definite solution
of the Lyapunov equation
( ~7T T ~
A iM; f M;Ad -F (I - G-' I ~T -F- BT lí ~ ))F C-, ( B~ f B; ti, l )T - 0.` z z z (- `GzfB~hzl
0
An algorithm to calculate all infinite horizon equilibria
In general the question arises how al] eyuilibria can be calculated for the infinite planning
horizon game. I'rom the previous analysis one can deduce the following algorithm:
Algorithm 8:
Stey I : Calculate matrix h1 from (5).
d
Step 2 : Calculate the spectrum of matrix M.
If the number of positive eigenvalues (courited with algebraic multiplicities)
is less than n, goto Step 5.
Step 3 : Calculate all M invariant subspaces 1Cin Kno' for which Rea ~ 0 for all
~ E o(M~K). If this set is empty, goto Step 5.
Step 4 : Let iC be an arbitrary element of the set determined in Step 3.
X
Calculate 3 nxn matrices X, Y and Z such that Ira Y -~.
Z
Denote Kr :- YX-'and Kz :- ZX-'.
~ u;(t) ~--G-' ~ ~T } BTh2 ~~(t,0)xo is an open - loop Nashz( ) I z z
equilibriunt strategy.
The spectrum of the corresponding closed - loop matrix
A-(Bl Bz)C-' ~ 02 ~ Bzhz I eyuals o(-Mf K).
If the set determi`ned in step 3 cjontains more elements one can repeat
this step tn calculate different equilibria.
Step 5 : End of algorithm.
Note that if the diagonal entries of matrix A are relatively large compared to the other
entries of matrix ,11, one can easily draw conclusions on the inertia of matrix M using
Gersgorin's theorem (see e.g. Lancaster et al. (1985)). In particular, this implies that in
case the players discount their losses, generically the game has a unique equilibrium, if
this discount factor is chosen large enough. In the next section we will use this property
and the algorithm to calculate the unique open-loop Nash equilibrium in the three player
EMU dynamic stabilization game.
IV. A dynamic stabilization game in the EMU
This section considers an application o[ the theoretical results of section 2. An in-
teresting application can be considered in the context of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) to which the European Union (EU) countries have committed themselves
to start on January 1, 1999, with the signing and ratifying of the Maastricht Treaty on
EMU in 199L With the EMU, the F,U countries replace their national currencies and
monetary policy autonomy by a common currency, the Euro, and a common monetary
policy that is designed and implemented by the European Central Bank (ECB). Fiscal
management, on the other hand, remains predominantly a national competence under
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E:~fU. With national monetary policy and exchange rate adjustment no longer avail-
able under EMU, the stabilization of output fluctuations is likely to require more fiscal
flexibility under EMU. The EMU Treaty, however, stipulates a set of fiscal stringency
criteria -the fiscal convergence criteria and the 'Excessive Deficit' procedure- that will
actually reduce fiscal flexibility in the EMU considerably. The fiscal restrictions are mo-
tivated by fears that large fiscal deficits will undermine the credibility of the low-inflation
commitment of the ECB.
In a situation of recession in the EU, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, how-
ever, will increase output rather than infíation and a conflict arises between the national
fiscal authorities and the ECB to which extent monetary and fiscal policies should ad-
just to stimulate macroeconomic recovery in the EU. To model such possible dynamic
stabilization conflicts that may arise in EMU, we extend a recently developed approach
by Neck and Dockner (1995) who analyse the dynamic interaction of the monetary au-
thorities of two symmetric countries. Their analysis considers a dynamic two-country
model that builds on an earlier analysis by Turnovsky, Ba~ar and d'Orey (1988) and
Turnovsky (1986), which on their turn are two-country model extensions of the Dorn-
busch (1976) model. In their analyses, the monetary policies of both countries affect
short-term output in both the domestic and foreign economies. The interdependencies
of both economies, hence, create a dynamic conflict between both monetary authorities.
Dutput, inflation and exchang,e rate adjustment and their implications for social welfare
are calculated for a number of different modes of strategic interaction: (i) cooperative
equilibria, (ii) open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria and (iii) open-loop and feedback
Stackelberg equilibria.
We extend these two-country models to a setting of a monetary union, implying cen-
ttalized monetary policy. In addition, we consider the effects of fiscal policy in such a
setting of a monetary union. We focus our attention on outcomes in the non-cooperative
Nash open-loop setting using the approach developed in the previous section.
Consider a situation where EMU has been fully implemented, implying that national
currencies have been replaced by a common currency, national central banks by the
E.CB and that the exchange rate has disappeared as an adjustment instrument. Capi-
tal markets are fully integrated arrd we abstain from any country-risk premia implying
that any interest differential is arbitraged away instantaneously. On the other hand, we
assume that there is no labour mobility between both EMU parts and that goods and
labour markets adjust sluggishly. Hence, the model displays Keynesian features in the
short-run.
The economic structure of the two-country EMU is given by the following equations,
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Table 1 A Two-Country E!~[U
country 1
(Ia) yi(t) - ó,s(t) - 7~ri(t) f Piyz(t)~-
f7ifi(t)
(lIa) s(t) - pz(t) - pi(t)
(IIIa) ri(t) - i(t) - ~i(t)
(IVa) mi(t) -pl(t) - Klyi(t) - ~la(t)
(Va) pt(t) - fiyi(t)
country 2
(Ib) yz(t) - -bzs(t) -7zrz(t) f Pzy~(t)f
trl2fz(t)
(IIb) s(t) - pz(t) - p~(t)
(IIIb) rz(t) - i(t) - pz(t)
(IVa) mz(t) - pz(t) - Kzyz(t) - ~zz(t)
(Vb) Pz(t) - ~zyz(t)
in which, y, denotes real output, p, the output price level, i the nominal interest rate
and, r, the real interest rate. s measures competitiveness of country 1 vis-à-vis country
2 as it is defined as the output price differential. f, equals the real fiscal deficit that the
fiscal authority sets. m denotes the amount of nominal money balances that the public
demands. F.xcept for the nominal interest rate and the rate of inflation, variables are in
logarithms and expressed as deviations from their long-run non-inflationary equilibrium.
(I) is the aggregate demand function having competitiveness, the real interest rate, for-
eign output and the fiscal deficit as its arguments. (II) defines the competitiveness of the
Eb1U countries relative to eachother. The definition of the real interest rate is given in
(III), ~he demand for real balances of the common currency is given in (IV). (V), finally,
gives the short run trade-off between infiation and output, along the Yhillips cur~e.
The common money market is cleared by ttie common nominal interest rate, i, and which
is found by imposing the condition that the total supply o[ Euro base money, mE(t),
which is set by the ECB, equals demand, m~(t) -~ mz(t). Money market equilibrium,
therefore, results if,
(V f) `(t) -~i t a2 (K iyi(t) f~zyz(t) f pi(t) f pz(t) - mE(t))
Both economies are connected by a number of channels through which price and output-
fluctuations in one part transmit themselves to the other part of the EMU. Output fluc-
tuations in both economies transmit themselves partly to the other EMU part through
the import channel. Therefore, the relative openness of both economies, as measured by
p;, implies an important interdependency of both economies. Also through their effect on
the demand for the common currency at the common money market, output fluctuations
iu the domestic economy have repurcussions for the foreign economy. Price differences
between the foreign and domestic economy affect relative competitiveness of both EMU
parts, as measured by s(t), and therefore production in both economies. In addition,
price fluctuations af[ect output because of the short-run output inflation trade-off and
affect money demand and by that the common interest rate.
Combining (I)-(VI) yields after some rewriting, that the model can be rewritten as the
following first-ord~r two-dimensional linear differential equation, with as state variables
the price level of both countries, p;(t), and as control variables the policy instruments of
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the ECB, mE(t), and the fiscal deficits, j~(t) and f2(t), set by the fiscal authorities:
.x(t) - f12(t) ~ a,u,(t) ~ B2u2(t) } B3u3 (t), ~(o) - ~o„ (12)
y(t) -C~(t) -~ D,u,(t) t D~uz(t) t D3u,(t), (13)
where x:- ~~2 I, u~ :- f~, u2 :- J2i u3 :- mE and y:- ~ y~ ~. For the specific
parameter values iwe refer to the Appendix.
Having modeled the economies of both EMU countries and derived the adjustment dy-
namics of output and prices over time, we still need to determine the monetary and fiscal
policies and to derive their dynamic adjustment over time as a consequence of interac-
tion between the macroeconomic policymakers. In order to do so, we need to specify
objective functions of the players. We assume that the players have quadratic objective
functions. Fiscal authorities are assumed to care about stabilization of inflation, output
and fiscal deficits, i.e.
dt~ ~- 2 ~~{Pi(t) } aiyi(t) f Qr.fi ( t)}e-eidt
JF~ - 2 I~{P~(t) f n2yi(t) t Í32fs(t)}e-eadt
(14)
(15)
'I'he assumption that the fiscal authorities value budget balance can refiect the notion
that high deficits, while beneficial to stimulate output, are not costless: they, to some
extent, crowd out private investment and lead to debt accumulation that has to be
serviced in the future by lower government spending and 1}igher taxes. Deficits in the
loss function also reflect the possibility that excessive deficits in the EMU will be subject
to sanctions, as proposed in the 'Excessive Deficits' procedure of the Maastricht Treaty
(art. 104c). Therefore, countries will prefer low fiscal deficits to high deficits.
The ECB also features inflation and output objectives. More in particular we assume
that it. cares about average inflation, pA(t), and average output, y,~(t), in the EU,
JE ~- 2 ~~{PA(t) ~ a 3yA(t) ~ Q3~E(t)}e-etdt
(16)
Average inflation and average output are weighted averages of the two countries, using
the relative sizes {w, 1-w} of the economies of country 1 and country 2 in the total EU
economy, i.e. Pn(t) :- wPi(t) f( 1 - w)P2(t) and yn(t) :- wyi(t) - f- (1 - w)y2(t).
We want t.o consider the dynamic stabilisation game in the context of a situation where
the European countries are in a situation of a recession, implying a negative output gap,
i.e. y;(0) G 0, and analyse how policy instruments and output and prices adjust over
time as a result of the dynamic interaction between macroeconomic policymakers in the
E~1ti. In this dynamic interaction one can consider a number of different strategical and
informational cot~cepts. We restrict here to the open-loop Nash case as outlined in the
previous sections.
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V. A simulation study
Before we can use algorithm 8 to find the equilibrium of the above stabilization game,
we first have to rewrite model (12)-(16) as a standard three player game corresponding
with (1).
To that end introduce ï(t) :- e-~B`a(t), y(t) :- e-~B`y(t) and u;(t) :- e-~B`u;(t). Fur-
thermore, let B:- (B, Bz B3); D:- (D~ Dz D3); es,~ :- (1 0 0 0 0)T, similarly, es,~
denote the j-th standard basis vector in lRs and, in general, e;,~ denote the j-th standard
basis vector in IR'; and g:- wez,, }(1 - w)ez,z, we see that the above minimization
problem (12)-(I6) can be rewritten as
ï(t)
~~
min J; :- 2 Jo {(~(t)T ui(t)uz (t)u3 (t))T F, uz(t) }dt, t- Fi, Fz, E, (17)
ua(t)
subject to
,i - (A - 2B1)ï -F- B,u, ~- Bzuz -~ B3u3i i(0) - xo,
y(t) - C:c(t) f D,u,(t) f Dzuz(t) I D,u,(t),
where
F,F, - 1 AT QTZOI ~ ez.iei i(A - 2BI B) t~i I DT ~ ezaez i(C D) f Qies.3ess;
AT - Z~Í T 1 CT T TFF~ - Br ~ ez,zez,z(A - 2BI B) f~z DT ez,zez,z(C D) -F Qzes,aes,a;
and
T - t T
FE - A BTZBI ) ggT (A - 2 B1 B) f as DT ~ ggT (C D) -1- Q3es,ses s.
Q~ I~ ~~ 5~
Now, factorize F, as ~T NT R'e ~ where Q; are 2x2 matrices; P;, O; and S;
S~ TT VT ~3i,
are `lxl matrices; and all other entries are scalars. With this notation, matrix G in (2)
becomes
R,F, NF, TF,
G' :- NFx R 2Fa VF~
rÉ VE R3E
(20)
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In the following simulations, we assume that the model parameters are such that this
matrix G is invertible. Finally, we have to formulate matrix M. It is easily verified from
(5) that M -
-A f zBI 0
QF, AT-29I
Q F~ ~
0 0 B TPF,
AT O'-BI 0 ~ -PF~ G-1 GF~
0 2 AT -'-BI - P~ SEy - E
B; 0 0 ~
0 B~ 0
0 0 B3
(21)
where we used the notation P, to denote the 2x3 matrix P, :- (P, O; S;). We are now
able to calculate the equilibrium of the game using algorithm 8.
In the following numerical example we consider the case of two symmetric EU countries.
We used the following parametervalues:
ry;-b;-p;-0.5,a;-0.3,r1;-1,~;-0.25,K;-1,w-0.5andB-0.1. Thisyields
(see appendix)
c' - ( 0.33 1.71 ) ' ~ -
( 0.0
J 0.25 ) ' C - ( -0.33 -1.33 ) '
P~-I ~~; D~-I O~; Ba-(0.833).
From this we deduce immed`iately that `
A - ( -0.09 -0.19 ) ; Bi - I 0~103 ~ ; Bz - ( 0.153 ) ' B3 - ( 0.1 ) ;
G-(-0.05 -0.077); Di-1 0~612 I; Bs-( 0612)'~3-(0.41 );
Substitution of these parametervalues` in the pllerformance weight criteria yields with
and
and
-0.24 -0.77 -0.01 -0.05
-0.01 -0.05 -0.24 -0.77
.x~ :- 0.15 ; yi :- 0.61 ; xZ :- -0.03 ; and yz :- -0.12
-0.03 -0.12 0.15 0.61
0.1 0.41 0.1 0.41
that
and
QË ~
FF, -~i2i f aiyiyi f Qies,3esa~
T T TFF~ - ia~z } azysyz f Qses.aes,a,
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For example, choosing a~ - az - aa - 1 and ~3~ - Qz - Q3 - 1 yields then
QF~ - ( O.U4 0.00 ) ' PF' - ( -0.03 ) ' GF' - ( 0.01 ) ' SF' - ( -O.U2 ) ,
R,F, - 1.89; NF, --0.08; TF, - 0.27; RzFi - 0.02; VF, --0.05; R3F, - 0.18;
and
QFx - ( 0.04 0.66 ) , PF' - ( 0011 ) ; GFx - ( -0.51 ) ' SF' - ( -0.34 ) ;
R,F, - 0.02; NF, --0.08; TF, --0.05; RzF, - 1.89; VF, - 0.26; R3F, - 0.18.
Finally, we obtain in a similar way by substituting the parametervalues into the above
expression for FE that
QE-(0.18 0.18); PE-(-0.11); GE-(-0.11); SE-(-0.18);
R1E - ~.06; NE - U.~6; Tg - O.lli R2E - 0.06; VE - O.lli R3E - 1.68.
Consequently, we find that
1.89 -0.08 0.26
G - -0.08 1.89 0.26
0.11 0.11 1.68
We have now specified all entries appearing in matrix M ( see (21)). Substitution of these
parameters yields
~ 0.195 0.008 0.012 -0.002 0.001 -0.00'l 0.005 0.005
0.008 0.195 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.012 0.005 0.005
0.500 0.025 -0.204 -0.019 0.002 -0.008 0.017 0.017
0.028 0.001 -0.009 -0.243 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
0.001 0.028 -0.000 0.000 -0.243 -0.010 0.001 0.001
0.025 0.500 -0.008 0.002 -0.019 -0.204 0.017 0.017
0.138 0.138 0.008 -0.002 -0.002 0.008 -0.234 -0.002
` 0.138 0.138 0.008 -0.00'2 -0.002 0.008 -0.002 -0.234
We can apply now algorithm 8 to determine the equilibrium of the game. Figure 1 dis-
plays the adjustment of output, prices, competitiveness, the common money supply and
fiscal deficits in t.he Nash open-loop case that results,
Insert Figure 1 here
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Panel ( a) gives the adjustment of the output price level in both countries and the relative
competitiveness of both countries. IC was assumed that the countries feature differertt
initial price levels, pt(0) - 0.05 and p2(0) - 0.1, implying that the economy of country
2 started further out of equilibrium than country 1. Output in country 2 ( Panel (c))
therefore is more depressed than output in country 1 initially. The depressed state of
the economy induces the policymakers to pursue active stabilization policies as shows
the adjustment of fiscal deficits and money supply in Panel (b).
The actual adjusment of policy instruments, and therefore of output and prices depends
critically on the weights {a;, Q; } that are assumed in the performance criteria of the
players. On their turn, these weights could reflect the stringency with which the Maas-
tricht Treaty is adhered to in practice. In particular, a strict interpretation of the Treaty
would imply that deficits will be penalized considerably and that the ECB's premise lies
almost exclusively with price stability. A loose implementation of the Maastricht Treaty
could imply that deficits are hardly penalized and that the ECB puts less emphasis on
price stability. Therefore, it seems to interesting to consider outcomes under alternative
values of ,13; where i-{1,2,3}.
Figure 2 considers outcomes for alternative values of Q; and allows us to compare
outcomes under our baseline scenario ( I) where pt - Qz -~i3 - 1( solid lines) with
alternative scenarios ( IT) where Q~ -,~32 - i33 - 0.5 (dotted lines) and (III) where
,3t -~- Q3 - 1.5 ( dashed lines). In the scenarios (II) and (III), the fiscal and mone-
tary stringency criteria of the Maastricht. Treaty are interpreted and implemented with
less resp. more strictness than in the baseline scenario (I). The following adjustment
picture emerges,
Insert Figure 2 here
As expected, less (dashed lines) viz. more (dotted lines) fiscal and monetary stringency
leads to more viz. less active fiscal (Panel (d) and (e)) and monetary policies (Panel (f)).
This leads to a faster viz. slower output adjustment (Panel (g) and (h)).
This simulation exercise shows that - for given values of the structural modelparameters
- the actual monetar}' and fiscal policies, and output and price adjustment depend on
the initial state of the EMU economies and the intensity with which the monetary and
fiscal stringency criteria of the EMU treaty are applied.
VI. Concluding remarks
In this paper we considered the existence and asymptotic behaviour of open-loop Nash
equilibrittm solut.ions in a two-player linear quadratic game which is a generalization of
the game that is usually studied in literature.
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We formulated both necessary and sufficient conditions for this problem and presented,
for the infinite-planning horizon garne, an algorithm to compute all equilibria. It will be
clear that there are still a number of open problems. More specific, one would like to get
more insight into the question under which conditions on t-he system parameters one may
expect that an equilibrium exists or, even more, there will be a unique equilibrium. In
particular, for both computational purposes and for a better theoretical understanding
of the open-loop problem, it would be necessary to have a global existence result for
the set of Riccati differential equations (8) and the set of algebraic Riccati equations
(ARE). Up to now this is, however, an unsolved problem. The obtained results can be
straightforwardly generalized to the N-player game.
We used the algorithm developed in the theoretical part in a simulation study to anal-
yse macroeconomic stabilization in the EMU. It was analyzed how monetary policy of the
ECB and national fiscal policies adjust in the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the dynamic
stabilization conflict between the ECB and the national fiscal authorities when the EMU
faces a recession. Moreover, it was analyzed how a looser and a stricter interpretation of
the monetary and fiscal stringency in the Maastricht Treaty affect outcomes in the EMU.
Appendix
In this appendix, we show how the system matrices A,B;,C and D; in (12,13) can
be determined from the model equations ( Ia)-(VI). By substituting (VI) and ( Va) intn
(I[Ia), and next, this result together with s(t) írom equation ( IIa) into ( Ia), we get for
yr
Yr(t) - br(Pz(t) - Pr(t))-
-rr(a~ -~ az {~~yr(t) f~zy2(t) t Pr(t) f P~(t) -~E(t)} -~~yr(t)) -~ P~yz(t) t n~h(t),
and similarly for y2
y2(t) - -6z(Pz(t) - Pr(t))-
7z( 1 {Kryr(t) ~ K~ys(t) } P~(t) f Ps(t) - mE(t)} -~sys(t)) f P2yr(t) t r12J2(t).~rf~z
Elementary calculations shows that both equations can be rewritten as
1 f a~'táz - 7r~r a,tá, - Pr yr(t)
a~~i - Pz 1-1- a~i - ryz~z )( yz(t) )
-b, - a~~ ó, - a~~ Pr(t)
á ~- b ~)( (t)z- a,ta, - 2- a~ta, Pz ~ } ` al;~a;I mE(t)} `
~ I~(t)-~~ o ~ Ï2(t)
Furthermore we have from (V):
Pr(t) ~r 0 yr(t)
Pz(t) - fl ~z ( yz(t) )
~r
0
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Introducing
C,' :- ( 1 f a~~? - 7t~t
I` a;}a, - pz
a~`-~;- Pt C, :- -á, - a~i
1 f a~ry~- z - ryz~z áz - a~taz
D, :- ~ ~~, Dz :- I 0 I D3 :- I
the above model can be rewritten as
~-a, taz~-a,ta~
7Lál - a~fazs-áz - a~faz
~t, and ~ :- ~ 0
C,y(t) - Cz(t) f D,u,(t) f Dzuz(t) t D,u3(t)
~z ) ,
)
~(t) - -y(t).
So, under the assumption that matrix C, is invertible ( which holds generically), we
obtain equations ( 12,13) if we introduce C :- C~ ~C, D, :- C;'Dl, Dz :- C;'Dzi
D3 :- Cl'D3r A:- ~C, B, :- -D,, Bz :- ~ Dz and B3 :- ~.D3.
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